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NOTES

Lynch v. Donnelly:

One Foot Off the Tightrope?
I.

INTRODUCTION

The words of the establishment clause, "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion,"' reflected the belief of
the Founding Fathers that an association of government and religion
threatened the liberty of both.' In recent years, the Supreme Court
has provided answers to increasingly difficult questions concerning
the balance between state neutrality and freedom of belief.3 In the
words of Chief Justice Burger, ". . . we have been able to chart a
course that preserved the autonomy and freedom of religious bodies
while avoiding any semblance of established religion. This is a 'tight
rope' and one we have successfully traversed."'
In determining whether a law violates the establishment clause,
the Court since 1971 has relied upon a three-pronged test formulated
in Lemon v. Kurtzman.' Specifically, the Court must find a secular
purpose, 6 an effect which neither advances nor inhibits religion, 7 and
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I, § L.
2. In the Virginia debates, predecessors to the constitutional debates, Roger
Williams sought to preserve the churches from the state, whereas Jefferson and his
supporters sought to preserve the state from the "mischievous" effects of religion.
See R. MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION 17 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
MORGAN].

3. Judicial consternation with the complexity of establishment clause cases was
expressed by Justice Powell in Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760 (1970): "[Clases arising under the [Religion] Clauses have
presented some of the most perplexing questions to come before this Court." Justice
Brennan described the difficulty: "The fact is that the line which separates the secular
from the sectarian in American life is elusive. The difficulty of defining the boundary with precision inheres in a paradox central to our scheme of liberty." Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 231 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
4. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672 (1970).
5. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See infra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
6. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). See infra notes 41-45 and
accompanying text.
7. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). See infra notes
46-54 and accompanying text.
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an absence of excessive government entanglement with religion 8 in
order to affirm constitutionality. The Lemon test has been applied
in a variety of contexts, including cases resulting from the awarding
of federal grants to build classroom buildings in sectarian institutions,9
allowing tax credits to parents of non-public school students,' 0 granting
churches veto power in licensing taverns, " and mandating the posting
of sacred texts in public school classrooms.2
Two recent decisions have signalled the Court's refusal to rely
solely upon the test articulated in Lemon for determining the constitutionality of state-sponsored activities with religious implications.'"
However, the Court followed the traditional Lemon analysis in Lynch
v. Donnelly,'4 but it added the crucial qualifier of context in the test's
application, leading to the Court's conclusion that the use of a nativity
scene in a municipal Christmas display was permissible governmental
action.'I
This note will review the background of establishment clause cases
and examine the Lynch decision in light of that precedent. This exposition of the legal analysis underlying the Lynch decision will suggest that the political divisiveness" and official sanction' 7 encouraged
by the majority in Lynch will result in precisely the kind of
official
involvement with religion feared by the Founding Fathers' 8 and in8. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). See infra notes 55-59 and
accompanying text.
9. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971). See infra note 69.
10. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973). See infra note 68.
11. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982). See infra note 71.
12. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980). See infra note 70.
13. See Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983). The majority opinion, expressed by Justice Rehnquist, termed the Lemon test "no more than a helpful signpost
in dealing with Establishment Clause challenges." Id. at 3066. See infra notes 77-83
and accompanying text. The Lemon test was not applied at all in Marsh v. Chambers,
103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983) (Nebraska's practice of beginning legislative sessions with
prayer led by state-paid chaplain found not violative of establishment clause). See
infra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
14. 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
15. See infra notes 90-122 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
18. Taxation to support religion and punishments for not going to church or
having "heretical opinions" were some of the acts which occurred in Colonial America.
See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878). Jefferson felt that the influence of religion in public matters was incisive. MORGAN, supra note 2, at 17. Madison
believed that competition among many sects would provide the necessary balance
among them, and that for government to fund a sect would result in inequality among
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tended to be prevented by the first amendment.
II.
A.

9

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

THE PRECURSORS

Secular Purpose
The first case in which the Court was required to decide the

meaning of separation of church and state was Everson v. Board
of Education."0 At issue was a New Jersey statute that allowed

tax money to be paid to parents for the cost of transporting their
children to public or parochial schools.21 In deferring to the legislature, the Court reasoned that a public purpose22 for the law
them, thus violating freedom of conscience. See Cahn, The "Establishment of

Religion" Puzzle, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1274, 1287-88 (1961). See also Casad, The
Establishment Clause and the Ecumenical Movement, 62 MIcH. L. REV. 419, 420-27
(1964).

19. Records of the congressional debates over the first amendment indicate two

major purposes of the establishment clause: (1) to keep the government from aiding
religion if the aid tended to establish a religion; and (2) to keep Congress from interfering with state religious establishments, such as the Puritan establishment in
Massachusetts. See M. MALBIN, RELIGION AND POLITICS: Ti

INTENTIONS OF THE

AUTHORS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 15-16 (1978). The choice of "an" establishment
of religion rather than "the" establishment of religion indicated an intent on the
part of the House-Senate conference committee to prohibit official activities which
promoted the beliefs of a particular sect. Id. at 14. Madison avowed strict separation of church and state; however, in the final analysis, he did not oppose aid to
religion as long as it was given pursuant to a constitutionally permitted legislative
end that did not discriminate among sects. Id. at 16. See generally MORGAN, supra
note 2, at 20-24 (evidence supports Madison's strict separationist position).
20. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). "This case forces us to determine squarely for the first
time what was 'an establishment of religion' in the First Amendment's conception. .. "
Id. at 29 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). For a discussion of establishment clause questions prior to Everson, see MORGAN, supra note 2, at 76-80. As a term of art the
"separation of church and state" has been differentiated from matters regarding
"separation of religion and government." The issues in Everson have been categorized
as church-state concerns, but whether a religious symbol can be displayed by government, as in Lynch, has been seen as a religion-state matter. Kauper, Everson v. Board
of Education: A Product of the Judicial Will, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 307, 321 (1973).
21. Everson, 330 U.S. at 1, 29-30.
22. 330 U.S. at 6. The plaintiff contended that the state allowed public tax
revenues to be used for private purposes in violation of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment in addition to his claim that the effect of the state statute
and the resolution was to support religion contrary to the prohibitions of the first
amendment. Everson, 330 U.S. at 5-6. His private purpose argument was based on
the theory that parents send their children to parochial schools to serve their own
desires. Id
An exact definition of "public purpose" has eluded courts to some degree.
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existed 2" and the attendance at private church-related schools by
some of the students did not render the actions of the legislature
fatally suspect.2" While stressing the need to maintain strict neutrality
in church-state matters, the majority concluded that the New Jersey
law did not breach the "wall of separation between church and
state."" Emphasizing the necessity of avoiding hostility toward
religion, 6 the majority drew a parallel between furnishing publiclyfunded police and fire protection to church schools and allowing
public tax revenues to pay bus fares of private school students."7

See Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1875) (municipal taxing to support local manufacturers struck down). This case set forth several factors for courts
to consider: (1) the government's pattern of usage, (2) the purposes of previous taxation, and (3) the types of purposes and things historically necessary for government
use and support. Id. at 665. See also Parkersburg v. Brown, 106 U.S. 487 (1883).
23. The majority adopted the view of previous courts that laws which eased
the ability of students to receive a secular education had a public purpose. See Cochran
v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930) (law providing free textbooks
to all school students not violative of fourteenth amendment taking clause); Interstate
Consol. St. Ry. Co. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79 (1907) (law requiring reduced
fare for schoolchildren upheld as exercise of state police power). The majority also
found public purpose in laws designed to reimburse needy parents and all parents
for fares paid in transporting students to school. The Court concluded that no less
a public purpose existed simply because some of the beneficiaries of the law were
parents of private school students. Everson, 330 U.S. at 7. The public purpose and
effect suggested in Everson were further developed in Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) and McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
See infra notes 41-54 and accompanying text.
24. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16. See supra note 23.
25. Id. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
Reynolds, which upheld a conviction of a Mormon for bigamy, contained an excerpt
from Thomas Jefferson's reply to a committee of the Danbury Baptist Association
at the time of the proposal of the first amendment: "I contemplate with sovereign
reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature
should 'make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between church and State." Id.
at 164. See infra notes 100-01 and accompanying text. The Court in Reynolds concluded that based upon Jefferson's view of the scope and effect of the amendment,
Congress retained power to legislate actions that violated "social duties" or were
"subversive of good order." Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164. The Court relied upon the
offensiveness of polygamy in European and Western societies in holding that laws
prohibiting polygamy in the Utah Territory were within the power of Congress.
26. Everson, 330 U.S. at 17. The power of the state cannot be used to "handicap" a religion, but must be neutral with respect to those who profess religion
and those who do not. Id. at 18.
27. In the absence of the state reimbursement, the majority speculated that
many children would not attend church school because their parents could not afford the bus fares. It reasoned that parents might not send their children to church
schools if publicly-paid policemen did not protect children going to and from school,
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The Court focused on the fact that the aid was paid to the parents,
not to the schools themselves. 2 8
The separation doctrine was further defined in McCollum v. Board
of Education,2 9 in which the Court struck down an Illinois law allowing
students to be released from public school classes to attend religious
instruction held in the school by private teachers.3" Relying upon the
doctrine of strict separation, 3 ' the Court held that public taxes could
not constitutionally be spent to provide religious teaching on public
school grounds.32 The teaching of religion in tax-supported schools,
combined with Illinois' system of compulsory education, was seen by
the Court as a method by which religious organizations could swell
their ranks, a goal banned by the first amendment. 3 Justice
or if the school did not receive basic government services such as furnishing of
sidewalks, sewage disposal, and police and fire protection. Id. at 17-18. Justice
Jackson, dissenting, emphasized the existence of a religious test in reimbursing parents
under the New Jersey scheme, and distinguished the police protection analogy by
finding that the policeman's duty was to society, not to members of a particular
religion. Id. at 15 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
28. The Court likened the reimbursement to parents to the "common-place"
practice of federal and state subsidies to homeowners, farmers, and businesses. Id.
at 7. It also acknowledged the right of parents to send their children to churchrelated schools pursuant to Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 520 (1925), and pointed
out that New Jersey contributed no financial support to the school itself, but merely
administered a program which benefited all students, regardless of the type of school
attended. Id. at 18.
29. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
30. Id. at 212.
31. Strict separation, as defined in Everson, observed the "wall of separation"
between church and state by prohibiting either from lending support to the other.
See supra note 25. The majority saw strict separation as a prohibition of government sponsorship of religion, taxation to support religion, or legislation exhibiting
a religious preference. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16. The dissent agreed with the necessity
of strict separation. "Legislatures are free to make, and courts to sustain, appropriations only when it can be found that in fact they do not aid, promote, encourage
or sustain religious teaching or observances, be the amount large or small." Id. at
52-53 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
32. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 210.
33. Id. at 210, 212. Justice Black, for the majority, described the prohibitions
mandated by the establishment clause:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another. Neither can force or influence a person to go or to remain
away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief
in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing
religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No
tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form
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Frankfurter, concurring, emphasized that the purpose of church-state
separation was to prevent religious issues from becoming a divisive
force in the community.34
However, the Court distinguished off-campus religious classes from
those held in the public school itself in upholding a similar releasedtime program in Zorach v. Clauson.3 New York public schools allowed
students, with parental permission, to leave school in order to receive
religious instruction or to attend devotional exercises. 36 Nonparticipating students were kept in the classroom, but no academic
instruction occurred during the time the released students were absent. 7
Justice Douglas, in announcing the majority opinion, pointed to the
lack of coercion in the New York scheme. 38 The Court found no inherent violation of first amendment principles by permitting students
to attend off-site religious programs, since the law's purpose was merely
to afford interested students the opportunity to participate in religious
matters.3 9 It concluded that the force of the public school was not
they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious
organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of
separation between church and State."
Id. at 210-11 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16).
34. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 228 n.19 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Divisiveness
was discussed by Chief Justice Burger in developing the entanglement prong of the
Lemon test. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 602, 622, reh'g denied, 404 U.S.
876 (1971). The entanglement prong was first articulated by Chief Justice Burger in
Walz, 397 U.S. at 674. See infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
35. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
36. Id. at 308.
37. Id. at 309.
38. Id. at 311. In McCollum, parents signed cards requesting that their children
be allowed to attend religious classes. The classrooms were turned over to privatelypaid religious teachers. Students taking religious instruction were required to attend
and the religious teacher reported attendance to the secular teacher. Id. Attendance
was also reported to the secular teacher in Zorach. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 308. The
element of coercion described in McCollum, wherein the force of the public school
was used to endorse religious teaching, was not seen to be present in Zorach. The
Court in Zorach found no indication that the public schools urged participation in
the off-campus religious exercise; merely, that the schools released students upon
the parents' request. Id. at 311.
39. Id. at 313. Justice Douglas stated: "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being. We guarantee the freedom to worship as
one chooses. We make room for as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual
needs of man deem necessary." Id. The decision in Zorach was received favorably
by those who supported state accommodation of religious beliefs. For a background
discussion of McCollum and Zorach, see MORGAN, supra note 2, at 126-31; see also
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being used to promote religious instruction. 0
Following this trend, the Court rejected any hint of accommodation of religious beliefs in the Sunday closing laws disputed in
McGowan v. Maryland.4 The Court not only found a secular purpose which overrode any benefit to religious organizations, ' 2 but stated
that the laws were constitutional in the absence of a showing that
the state's coercive power was being used to further religion. 3 Though
4
Sunday closings reflected the beliefs of many religious sects, the Court
concluded, after a historical analysis, that providing a uniform day
of rest was a strictly secular reason for Sunday closings and was not
related to religious beliefs.45 This secular purpose test, a refinement
of the public purpose principle stated in Everson, became the first
prong of the Lemon test.
F. SORAUF, THE WALL OF SEPARATION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF CHURCH

AND STATE 20-24 (1976). Justice Black, who wrote the majority opinion in McCollum,
dissented in Zorach, finding no significant difference between attending religious classes
on or off campus. Moreover, he found that New York's compulsory education laws
furnished a pool of students for religious instruction, which was expressly found
unconstitutional in McCollum. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 317 (Black, J., dissenting).
However, the fact that some students were released specifically to attend the classes
and other students were kept in the public school classroom should have been similar
enough to the circumstances disputed in McCollum to warrant invalidation of the
New York law. Id. at 316-17. Justice Frankfurter, in a separate dissent, echoed a
similar belief: "There is all the difference in the world between letting the children
out of school and letting some of them out of school into religious classes." Id.
at 320 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
40. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 311.
41. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
42. Id. at 449. For a discussion of the effect of the Sunday closing laws on
those persons who do not observe a Sunday Sabbath, see Kushner, Toward the Central Meaning of Religious Liberty: Non-Sunday Sabbatarians and the Sunday Closing
Cases Revisited, 35 Sw. L. J. 557 (1981) (arguing that free exercise values override
nonestablishment concerns).
43. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 445.
44. Id. at 431. Kings of England had banned Sunday shopping, certain games,
and sports. Id. at 432. American Sunday closing laws derived from the early English
laws, which were designed to promote the religious observance. Id. at 431-33. The
American colonies enacted their own laws, some of which compelled church attendance, restricted activities on Sunday, and curtailed Sunday labor. Id. at 433. The
religious purpose behind these laws was obvious. Id. In the 1700's, the religious
justifications, while still voiced, began to give way to secular arguments for Sunday
closings, which stressed the need for a uniform day of rest. Id. at 433-34. See infra
note 45.
45. Id. The majority stated that to invalidate the laws simply because their
origins lay in religion would evidence a hostility toward public welfare. Id. In addition, the Maryland statutes involved allowed the sale of liquor, playing of slot

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

Primary Effect
The second prong of the Lemon test was formulated in Abington
School District v. Schempp." A Pennsylvania law which mandated
that each public school day commence with the reading of Bible verses"'
was challenged by a Unitarian man and his children. 8 In affirming
the lower court's decision to enjoin the enforcement of the statute,
the majority ruled that the readings and accompanying exercise 9 con-

machines, and the operation of amusement parks and beaches, none of which were
consistent with a religious view of the Sunday Sabbath. Id. at 448.
46. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
47. The law mandated that "At least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be
read, without comment, at the opening of each public school on each school day.
Any child shall be excused from such Bible reading, or attending such Bible reading,
upon the written request of his parent or guardian." Schempp, 374 U.S. at 205.
During the preceding term, the Court struck down a state-created prayer for use
in New York public schools in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). The majority
found the prayer to be a step toward the establishment of religion. Id. at 425. The
Court interpreted the establishment clause to mean that composing prayers as part
of a religious program was not a proper governmental function. Id. Such a
government-sanctioned prayer would indirectly coerce religious minorities to conform.
Id. at 431. It has been suggested that the prayer in Engel no more created an establishment of religion than certain religious preferences in patriotic songs such as America
and The Star-Spangled Banner. Moreover, the plethora of constitutional amendments
proposed in the wake of Engel was an outraged response to the Court at a time
when several states, by statute and judicial decision, allowed prayer in public schools.
See Sutherland, Establishment According to Engel, 76 HARv. L. REV. 25, 39-51 (1962).
Whether the decision in Engel is correct depends upon whether the case is seen as
an establishment clause or free exercise question. See infra text accompanying note
51. See also Kauper,. Prayer, Public Schools and the Supreme Court, 61 MICH. L.
REV. 1031 (1963). For an interesting analysis of Schempp and Engel, see Pollak,
Foreward: Public Prayers in Public Schools, 77 HARv. L. REV. 62 (1963)"(Engel
was decided on the basis of 17th and 18th century history, whereas Schempp was
decided on prior establishment clause cases).
48. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 206.

49. Every school day, students would broadcast to each classroom, via the public
address system, 10 Bible verses. The students reading the verses were supervised by
a teacher, and were allowed to choose the verses they read. The school furnished
the King James version, though the Douay and the Revised Standard versions had
been used, as well as the Jewish Holy Scriptures. No comments were solicited or
made during or after the readings, and no explanations were given. Students were
free to leave the room or remain. Recitation of the Lord's Prayer followed, in which
students were asked to stand and recite the prayer in unison. The exercise concluded
with a salute to the flag and announcements of interest to the students. In those
schools having no public address system, the teacher or students read the versus
along with the Lord's Prayer, Pledge of Allegiance and announcements. Id. at 206-07.

1984:1231

LYNCH V. DONNELLY

stituted a religious observance under the auspices of school officials,
and that the Bible reading preferred Christianity." °
Acknowledging that the inquiries under establishment and free
exercise clauses could overlap,"' the majority articulated a test which
looked at whether the purpose and primary effect of the law advanced
or inhibited religion.5 2 In striking down the Pennsylvania law, the
Court contrasted the on-campus program in Schempp with the offcampus program upheld in Zorach," and concluded that the
Pennsylvania exercises in public schools were of a religious nature
and thus advanced religion in violation of the establishment clause.5 "

50. Id. at 210-11. Said Justice Clark for the majority, "While the Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the use of State action to deny the rights of free exercise
to anyone, it has never meant that a majority could use the machinery of the state
to practice its beliefs." Id. at 226. The trial court found that the Holy Bible, which
the law required to be read, was a Christian document. Schempp, 201 F. Supp. 815,
819 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (on remand). This opinion was based in part on expert testimony
which (1) characterized the Holy Bible as "convey[ing] the message of Christians,"
and (2) pointed out that, aside from the literary and moral value of certain Biblical
passages, that reading from the New Testament without explanation would have a
profound psychological effect on Jewish students. Schempp, 177 F. Supp. 398, 401-02
(E.D. Pa. 1959).
51. Justice Clark set forth the purpose of the free exercise clause as to ensure
individual religious freedom, and distinguished a claim under the establishment clause
as not requiring a showing of coercion. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223.
52. The test was stated as follows:
[Wihat are the purpose and primary effect of the enactment? If either is
the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the
scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to
say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause, there must
be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances
nor inhibits religion.
Id. at 222.
53. Id. at 223. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
54. Id. Justice Brennan, concurring, affirmed the belief that government should
remain neutral with regard to religion, and he proposed an alternative test:
What the Framers meant to foreclose, and what our decisions under the
Establishment Clause have forbidden, are those involvements of religious
with secular institutions which (a) serve the essentially religious activities of
religious institutions; (b) employ the organs of government for essentially
religious purposes; or (c) use essentially religious means to serve governmental ends, where secular means would suffice.
Id. at 294-95 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan reiterated his support of
this test in Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. at 3340 n.11 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See infra note 89 and accompanying text. He reasserted this view in Lynch, 104
S. Ct. 1375 n.11 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Excessive Government Entanglement
Chief Justice Burger articulated the third prong of the Lemon
test, excessive government entanglement with religion, in Walz v. Tax
Commission of New York," in which the Court upheld tax

exemptions" for real estate owned by religious organizations and used
specifically for worship. The majority relied upon a flexible standard
in affirming the need for government neutrality." The Court compared the "aid" of tax exemption to the "aid" of paying bus fares
for parochial school students in Everson, and finding no fundamental differences between the two, concluded that the former did not

constitute an establishment of religion. 8 In determining that the
legislative purpose of the statute was to benefit a broad class of notfor-profit organizations, the Court emphasized that, not only must
the purpose be secular in nature, but government and religion must
not become unduly entangled as a result. 9
B.

THE LEMON TEST

The concepts of secular purpose, primary effect, and excessive
government entanglement with religion were combined and articulated
55. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). Walz, a property owner, sought an injunction to prevent the New York Commission from granting property tax exemptions for the
religious organizations in question. The law, authorized by the New York Constitution, also exempted property used for educational or charitable purposes and operated
by a not-for-profit organization. Id. at 666.
56. Tax exemption was seen not as sponsorship, but as abstinence from demanding that the church support the state. Id. at 676. Congress since its early days has
approved of the religion clauses as authorizing tax exempt status to religious bodies.
Id. at 677. See generally, L. PFEFFER, GOD, CAESAR, AND THE CoNsTrrTnoN 65-81
(1975). Justice Brennan concurred in Walz, noting that 1) religious organizations contribute to communities in non-religious ways; and 2) such groups contribute to the
pluralism of society. Walz, 397 U.S. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan,
in a separate concurring opinion in Walz, stated that the effect of subsidies and
exemptions was the same, but subsidies involved more direct contact which would
provide opportunities for political controversy. Id. at 691 (Harlan, J., concurring).
57. The general principle ... is this: that we will not tolerate either governmentally established religion or governmental interference with religion. Short
of those expressly proscribed government acts there is room for play in the
joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.
Walz, 397 U.S. at 669.
58. Id. at 671. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
59. The Court emphasized the necessity of determining entanglement:
Determining that the legislative purpose of tax exemption is not aimed
at establishing, sponsoring, or supporting religion does not end the inquiry,
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as a comprehensive test in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 6 0 Chief Justice Burger,

for the majority, declared that a Rhode Island law, which allowed

for the payment of salary supplements to teachers of secular courses
in non-public schools, was unconstitutional. 6" In the same decision,

the Court also struck down a Pennsylvania law which allowed non-

public schools to receive tax monies for teaching secular subjects. 2
The majority opinion decreed that a review of the three tests set forth

in McGowan, Schempp and Walz was essential to a proper establish-

ment clause analysis of the two statutes.6 3 After finding a secular purpose and a primary effect that did not advance or inhibit religion, 6
the Court held that the degree of state surveillance necessary to

distinguish between secular and religious costs created an excessive

entanglement between government and religion. 65 The Court also feared
that provision of state aid to sectarian schools could result in an
unhealthy mix of religion and politics if the parochial school teachers
were tempted to inject religious dogma into their presentations of
however. We must also be sure that the end result-the effect-is not an
excessive government entanglement with religion. The test is inescapably one
of degree.
Id. at 674.
60. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). See generally Note, Lemon v. Kurtzman: First Amendment Religion Clauses Re-Examined, 33 U. PITT. L. REV. 330 (1971).
61. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 620.
62. Id. at 621-22.
63. Chief Justice Burger stated the test:
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the
cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years. Three such
tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster
"an excessive government entanglement with religion." (citations omitted)
Id. at 612-13. Whether the entanglement is excessive depends on the character and
purpose of the benefited institution, the type of state aid, and the resulting relationship between the state and the religious organization. Id. at 614-15. See also Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion in Walz, 397 U.S. at 695 (Harlan, J., concurring).
64. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613-14.
65. Id. at 619. The majority saw difficulty in ensuring that the parochial school
teachers would not inject religious belief into the teaching of secular subjects. "Unlike
a book, a teacher cannot be inspected once so as to determine the extent and intent
of his or her personal beliefs and subjective acceptance of the limitations imposed
by the First Amendment." Id. The Court feared further entanglement based on the
Everson distinction between a subsidy paid to the students' parents and one paid
directly to the schools. Stated the Court: "[Tihe government's post-audit power to
inspect and evaluate a church-related school's financial records and to determine which
expenditures are religious and which are secular creates an intimate and continuing
relationship between church and state." Id. at 621-22.
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secular subjects." The majority emphasized the utility of the Lemon
test in attacking the three main evils sought to be avoided by the
establishment clause: " 'sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.' "67
Having established this basic framework for identifying and
scrutinizing the breadth of permissible church-state relationships, the
Court employed the Lemon test with studied consistency until 1982.
The issues arising under the establishment clause during this time
derived from a variety of factual settings, including funding for elementary and secondary education programs,68 problems with higher
66. Id. at 622. Chief Justice Burger looked to the potential for divisiveness:
Ordinarily political debate and division, however vigorous or even partisan, are normal and healthy manifestations of our democratic system of
government, but political division along religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to protect ....
The potential divisiveness of such conflict is a threat to the normal political
process. (citation omitted) (emphasis added)
Id. at 622.
67. Id. at 612 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 668).
68. A New York law allowing the state to reimburse church-related schools
for the administrative expenses of state-mandated recordkeeping and testing was struck
down in Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472
(1973). The state argued that the expenses sought to be reimbursed were related to
secular and nonideological services. Id. at 478. The Court, in rejecting New York's
contention, pointed out that the bulk of payments would be made for administration, drafting and grading both standardized tests and examinations prepared by the
private school teachers themselves. Id. The Court held that the law failed to satisfy
the primary effect prong of the Lemon test. Speaking for the majority, Chief Justice
Burger stated that no assurances existed that teachers would not draft the examinations without "inculcat[ing] students in the religious precepts of the sponsoring
church." Id. at 480. The Court based its opinion largely on its decision in Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), in which
a variety of state aid to private education was found to violate the establishment
clause. State-funded repairs to private schools, tuition reimbursement to parents, and
tax credits to parents were found to have the primary effect of advancing the religious
mission of sectarian schools. Id. at 779-80. Though the majority found no need to
apply the excessive entanglement test, it warned of the divisive potential of aid programs to private education. Such programs tended to grow and develop their own
constituencies, the Court stated, and though this fact alone was not enough to strike
down a law, it should not be ignored. Id. at 797-98. At least one commentator has
offered a replacement to the excessive entanglement test. See Piekarski, Nyquist and
Public Aid to Private Education, 58 MARQ. L. REv. 247, 264-66 (1975) (A challenged

law should stand if the state neither violates the right of free exercise nor uses tax
revenues to support religion; both must be balanced against legislative purpose.).
The Court upheld a Pennsylvania law providing for the loan of secular textbooks
to students in church-related elementary and secondary schools in Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349 (1975). In applying the Lemon test, the Court found a legitimate secular
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education, 9 the placement of religious symbols on public grounds,70
and the exercise of veto powers by churches over the granting of liquor
licenses.71
C. THE DEPARTURE

Despite this longstanding reliance on the Lemon analysis, the
Court nevertheless adopted a different standard when it reviewed the
question of religious discrimination posed in Larson v. Valente.12 In

Larson, a Minnesota law imposed registration and reporting requirements only on religions that solicited over fifty per cent of their
funds from non-members. 3 Although the Court of Appeals applied

purpose in the loan of the textbooks, which were also used in public schools. Id.
at 362. However, portions of the same law authorizing the loan of instructional
materials and equipment and auxiliary testing services directly to the schools failed
the primary effect and excessive entanglement tests and were struck down. Id. at
362-73. Even though the aid itself was neutral, it was given directly to schools in
which religion was seen to be pervasive, and where most of the school's functions
were included in the "religious mission." Id. at 366.
69. See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (Catholic
colleges benefited by state subsidy were not "pervasively sectarian"); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (secular purpose found for construction grants to churchrelated colleges). The strengths and weaknesses of aid to colleges and elementary
and secondary schools are based on a theory that younger, more impressionable
students should be free from ideological influences, whereas college students have
more perspective from which to develop their beliefs regardless of any outside influences. For arguments pro and con, see Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment and Doctrinal Development, 81 HARv. L. REV. 513, 564-90 (1968).
70. A Kentucky law requiring copies of the Ten Commandments to be posted
in public school classrooms was struck down as violative of the establishment clause
in Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam). The Court invalidated the
law under the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test, characterizing the Ten Commandments as "plainly religious." Id. at 41. It has been suggested that the Court
could have provided more precedential value to the case by finding the law invalid
under the primary effect prong of Lemon. See Comment, Stone v. Graham: A Fragile
Defense of Individual Religious Autonomy, 69 Ky. L.J. 392, 404-11 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, A Fragile Defense]. The posting of the texts was found unconstitutional despite a caption on each copy which read: 'The secular application of the
Ten Commandments is clearly seen in its adoption as the fundamental legal code
of Western Civilization and the Common Law of the United States."' Stone, 449
U.S. at 41. But see Allen v. Morton, 495 F.2d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (use of creche
upheld when accompanied by explanation disclaiming affiliation with religious
message).
71. See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (local ordinance
which treated church opposition to new liquor licenses as tantamount to veto
represented excessive entanglement between church and government).
72. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
73. Id. at 231.
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the Lemon test in striking down the law, the Supreme Court relied
upon the strict scrutiny standard, 4 as the law tended to prefer certain religions over others. 5 Finding that the law did not further a
compelling state interest, the majority examined the law under the
Lemon test, and concluded that the excessive entanglement prong was
not met in Larson, thereby affirming the lower court."
A year later, the Court returned to the Lemon test in Mueller
v. Allen,"' but issued a qualifier: "While this principle is well settled,
our cases have emphasized that it [the Lemon test] provides 'no more
than [a] helpful signpost' in dealing with Establishment Clause
challenges."" In upholding the validity of a Minnesota statute allowing parents of parochial school students to deduct certain educational
expenses from their gross income, Justice Rehnquist, for the majority,
noted that few government assistance programs had failed the secular
purpose prong of Lemon." The Court deferred to the legislature in
assessing the primary effect, noting that the law applied to all parents,
whether their children attended public, parochial, or non-religious
private schools. 8" In analyzing the primary effect of the law, the Court
looked to its previous rationale in Committee for Public Education
and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,8 ' to affirm that the breadth of the
aid was a determinative factor.8" The Court concluded its analysis by
74. Strict scrutiny, a heightened standard of review, requires that the state must
have a compelling state interest and the legislation must be "closely fitted to further
that interest." Id. at 247.
75. Id. at 244-46. "[T]he Lemon v. Kurtzman 'tests' are intended to apply
to laws affording a uniform benefit to all religions, and not to provisions ...that
discriminate among religions." Id. at 252.
76. Id. at 253. The Court explained: "Although application of the Lemon tests
is not necessary to the disposition of the case before us, those tests do reflect the
same concerns that warranted the application of strict scrutiny to [the] . . . fifty
per cent rule." Id. at 252.
77. 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983).
78. Id. at 3066. See Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
79. Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3066. The Court stated its reluctance to look behind
legislative intent with a "plausible" secular purpose was evident on the face of the
law. Id. The Court found that the purposes of the law, which in practice allowed
parents of parochial school students to deduct tuition, a deduction unavailable to
parents of public school students, were (1)to ensure an educated public, (2) serve
the public interest in keeping private schools healthy, thereby keeping a burden off
the public schools, and (3) maintaining the concept that a private school can serve
as a benchmark for public schools. Id. at 3067.
80. Id. at 3068.
81. 413 U.S. 756 (1973). See supra note 68.
82. Mueller, 103 S.Ct. at 3068. In Nyquist, the tax credits and reimbursements
were granted only to parents of private school students. The petitioners in Mueller
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and
holding that the amount of entanglement between government
3
religion under the Minnesota law would be negligible.
Historical perspective provided the foundation for the Court's
decision in Marsh v. Chambers.1 The majority upheld Nebraska's
practice of opening its legislative sessions with a prayer recited by
a state-paid chaplain. 5 This practice was seen as a tradition beginning with the Continental Congress, and continued by the First Congress and subsequent Congresses." Chief Justice Burger, expressing
the majority view, stated that the practice did not tend to establish
a religion as much as it merely accommodated widely held beliefs.87
Arguments that the sixteen years of service by the chaplain, a
Presbyterian minister, constituted an official endorsement of religion
were rejected by the Court, as were contentions that the prayers which
were used were in the Judeo-Christian tradition. The dissent, led
by Justice Brennan, found the practice invalid under the Lemon test,
and suggested that the non-religious functions of such prayers could
be accomplished in a secular fashion. 9
claimed that 96% of private school students attended church schools, and thus the
law benefited religion. The majority stated: "We would be loath to adopt a rule
grounding the constitutionality of a facially neutral law on annual reports reciting
the extent to which various classes of private citizens claimed benefits under the law."
Id. at 3070.
83. The Minnesota law disallowed deductions for books and materials used
in teaching religion. The only possible entanglement, the Court suggested, might result
from state decisions regarding whether or not a textbook or type of instructional
material qualified for a deduction. The Court noted that this procedure was not
held to violate the establishment clause in Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236
(1968) (textbook loan plan to parochial schools upheld as not having a primary effect
of advancing religion). Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3071.
84. 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983).
85. Id. at 3337.
86. The majority reasoned:
No more is Nebraska's practice of over a century, consistent with two centuries of national practice, to be cast aside. It can hardly be thought that
in the same week Members of the First Congress voted to appoint and to
pay a chaplain for each House and also voted to approve the draft of the
First Amendment for submission to the States, they intended the Establishment Clause of the Amendment to forbid what they had just declared
acceptable.
Id. at 3335-34.
87. Id. at 3336.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 3338. (Brennan, J., dissenting). "'To invoke Divine guidance on a
public body entrusted with making the laws,' is nothing but a religious act." Id.
Justice Brennan's analysis of the Nebraska law under the Lemon tests found that
first, the practice of prayer was religious in nature. Id. Second, the prestige associated
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III. Lynch v. Donnelly
A. FACTS

The establishment clause question arose again when residents of
Pawtucket, Rhode Island, filed suit against the City of Pawtucket
and its mayor, Dennis Lynch, to enjoin the city from including a

nativity scene, or creche, in its annual Christmas display." Prominently
displayed in a downtown park near the shopping district, the creche
and accompanying figures had been part of the city's holiday celebration for over forty years. 9 ' The park was owned by a not-for-profit
organization, and the display was erected in cooperation with the
downtown retail merchants association.9"
Applying the three-prong Lemon test, the United States District

Court held that use of the creche had no secular purpose,93 conferred

"more than a remote and incidental benefit on Christianity," 9 4 and
enjoined the city from using the creche in its display. 9 5
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision.96 However, the appeals court employed a strict scrutiny
standard based on the recent Supreme Court decision in Larson v.
Valente. 7 It determined that the city officials had failed to demonstrate
with the legislature was found to be analogous to prayer in public schools, and
therefore advanced religion. Id. at 3338-39. Finally, the law failed the excessive entanglement test in two ways: by making the state a monitor (choosing the chaplain
and limiting him to "suitable" prayers), and by causing divisiveness in the choice
of chaplain and prayers. Id. at 3339. See Comment, A FragileDefense, supra note
70, at 407. (which version of the Ten Commandments to be used caused a furor
among officials).
90. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1358. The creche included nearly life-size figures of
the infant Jesus, Mary, Joseph, animals, shepherds and kings. Purchased by the city
in 1973 for $1,365, the value at the time of suit was $200. The city paid for erection
and dismantling costs, approximately $20 yearly. Lighting costs were nominal. Id.
91. Included in the display were a banner reading "Seasons Greetings," colored
lights, candy-striped poles, a Santa Claus house, reindeer pulling Santa's sleigh, a
Christmas tree and carolers, and cutout figures representing an elephant, clown and
teddy bear. Id.
92. Id.
93. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1170, 1174 (D. R.I. 1981).
94. Id. at 1178.
95. Id. at 1181.
96. Lynch, 691 F.2d 1029 (Ist Cir. 1982).
97. The First Circuit saw Pawtucket's use of the creche as discriminating between Christians and non-Christians, and followed the Court's lead in Larson in
applying strict scrutiny. The First Circuit also noted that the lower courts in Larson
had also applied the Lemon test. Id. at 1034. See supra note 76 and accompanying
text.
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that they had a compelling state interest for including the creche in
the display; this consideration was based upon the district court's finding, under the Lemon analysis, that there was no legitimate secular
purpose for doing so." The city then filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, which was granted."
B.

COURT'S MAJORITY

The majority, led by Chief Justice Burger, focused on the difficulty of complete separation of church and state, doubting the practical feasibility of the "wall"' 0 0 between church and state discussed
in Everson.'' It pointed out that accommodation of all religions and
0"
an absence of hostility toward religion is a constitutional goal.' As
in Marsh, the Court turned to a historical analysis of official
acknowledgements of religion,'0 3 and concluded that the Court's
primary purpose was to strike down legislation that "would establish
'°
a religion or religious faith, or tend to do so." " "
As a result, "[tihe Clause erects a 'blurred, indistinct and variable
barrier, depending on all the circumstances of a particular
relationship.""'" In articulating the standard of review formulated
in Lemon, the Court altered its approach by de-emphasizing the
precedential force of the Lemon test.' 6 To support its view, the
98. Id. at 1035.
99. 460 U.S. 1080 (1983).
100. The term "wall of separation" was originated by Jefferson and discussed
in illustrating the necessity for neutrality in church-state matters. See Everson, 330
U.S. at 16; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
101. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1359.
102. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 31-33.
103. Id. at 1360-61. The Court looked to the establishment of Thanksgiving
and Christmas as national holidays, presidential proclamations observing them, and
the fact that federal employees are given both days off. Id. at 1360. In addition,
Presidents have proclaimed such religiously-affiliated special observances, such as Jewish
High Holy Days. Id. at 1361. Publicly-supported art galleries, in particular the National
Gallery of Art, display religious paintings. Id. at 1361. The national motto, "In
God We Trust," indicates a governmental acknowledgment of religion, as does the
language, "One nation under God," from the Pledge of Allegiance. Id. at 1360-61.
The majority stated that oral arguments in Lynch itself were held in a room in which
hung a painting of Moses with the Ten Commandments, and that chapels are provided in the Capitol. Id.
104. Id. at 1361.
105. Id. at 1362 (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614).
106. The Court stated: "But, we have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness
to be confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area." (citations omitted)
Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1362.
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majority cited its use of strict scrutiny in Larson, and the absence
of any Lemon analysis in Marsh.
In examining Pawtucket's use of the creche, the Cotirt stressed
the importance of context in determining permissible conduct.' 0 ' The

Court found that the purpose of the creche, when viewed in the setting

of the holiday season, was not exclusively religious in nature, but
also had characteristics of significant historical and traditional value.' 08
The majority found the district court's finding of a primary effect
which advanced religion to be "clearly erroneous." 09 The Court found
no more of an endorsement of religion through display of the creche
than in other establishment clause cases where statutes were upheld
despite some benefit to religion.110
The majority agreed with the district court's finding that no
excessive entanglement between government and religion resulted from
Pawtucket's

entanglement.'

use of the creche in the area of administrative

However, it rejected the district court's conclusion

107. Id. at 1362. The issue of context was compared to that emphasized in Stone,
supra note 70, where the majority acknowledged that the Bible could be integrated
into a study of history or civilization in the public schools without offending the
Constitution. Stone, 449 U.S. at 42.
108. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1363.
109. Justice Brennan disputed the majority's decision that the findings of the
district court were "clearly erroneous." Id. at 1375 n.11. "I am at a loss to understand how the [district] court's ...

finding ...

can, in the face of the Lemon test,

be dismissed as simply an 'error as a matter of law."' Id.
110. The Court found the respondent's arguments unpersuasive. Id. at 1363.
See Florey v. Sioux Falls School Dist., 619 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1980) (Christmas
assemblies and singing of carols in public schools not violative of establishment clause).
But see Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal-. 3d 792, 587 P.2d 663, 150 Cal.
Rptr. 867 (1978) (illuminated Latin cross on city hall intended to celebrate secular
aspects of Christian holidays held to be impermissible preference of one religion over
another).
111. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1364. The district court separated the excessive entanglement prong into two parts: administrative entanglement and political divisiveness.
See Lynch, 525 F. Supp. at 1178-79. The administrative prong is violated if government is involved in "ongoing contact" with religious organizations. Id. at 1179. The
majority agreed with the district court, which found that the city had not consulted
church authorities either prior to acquiring the creche or since its initial display.
Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1364. The city's contributions to the display were seen as de
minimus. Id. But see Schempp, 374 U.S. at 229-30 (Douglas, J., concurring). "It
is not the amount of public funds expended ...

it is the use to which public funds

are put that is controlling." Justice Douglas warned against weakening the establishment clause by indirect means. See infra note 179. The political divisiveness prong
of excessive entanglement recognizes that political division is likely to occur if government and religion become too closely tied. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. at 1179. Chief Justice
Burger disagreed with the district court's finding that political divisiveness had oc-
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that the political divisiveness generated by the litigation was of the
type that was contemplated by the third prong of the Lemon test." 2
Chief Justice Burger added that political divisiveness alone cannot
be used to invalidate otherwise permissible conduct."13 Justice O'Connor, in a concurring opinion, used a slightly different test to reach
the same conclusion. She focused on whether the government's intent was to implicitly endorse or disparage religion'" rather than
examining the secular purpose of the government's activity.II 5 -Finding an absence of such intent, Justice O'Connor classified the nativity
scene as a traditional symbol of a public holiday.",
Justice Brennan, speaking for the minority, disagreed with the
Court's use of context in applying the Lemon test." ' The dissent emphasized the commercial nature of the Pawtucket display, and found
the inclusion of a religious symbol suspect." 8 In addition, the dissent
pointed to the history of the Christmas celebration in the United States,
and concluded that the drafters of the first amendment did not concurred, and he observed that any divisiveness related to the inclusion of the creche
resulted from the lawsuit itself. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1365. See infra note 140.
112. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. at 1180.
113. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1364.
114. Id. at 1368 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor examined
"whether the government intends to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval
of religion." Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Justice Brennan stated that the Court sought to "explain away the clear
religious import of the creche" by relying on context. Id. at 1375-76 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). He disagreed with the majority's view that the creche was secular in
the holiday context, and found that the majority approach "purged" the symbol
of any religious content. Id. at 1376. Justice Brennai further asserted that since
(1) the creche was placed in a position of prominence in the display, (2)the city
issued no disclaimer of any religious endorsement, (3) a specifically religious practice, such as the prayer in Engel, cannot be justified even in g secular setting, and
(4) the creche is a symbol of Christ's birth and thus retains meaning to Christians,
that the use of the nativity scene constituted government sponsorship of Christianity.
Id. at 1376-77.
The majority rejected this view by holding that if the nativity scene constituted
a violation of the establishment clause, so did every other type of official acknowledgment of the Christmas season. Id. at 1365. It cautioned that such a result "would
be a stilted over-reaction contrary to our history and to our holdings." Id. To Justice
Brennan's argument that the creche had been stripped of its religious meaning, Chief
Justice Burger responded: "Justice Brennan states that ...

the Court ...

has equated

the creche with a Santa's house or a talking wishing well. Of course this is not true."
(citation omitted) Id. at 1365 n.12.
118. Id. at 1373 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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sider Christmas a public holiday, and could not have had tolerance
of government-sponsored creches in mind when the amendment was
drafted." 9 To the Court's finding that "In God We Trust""'2 or "One
Nation Under God"' 2 ' constitute government acknowledgment of
religion, Justice Brennan suggested that such phrases and related practices have lost their religious significance through repetition, calling
' ' 22
them a form of "ceremonial Deism. '

IV.

ANALYSIS

The Court in Lynch has significantly advanced the case for increasing tolerance of state-sanctioned' 23 religious activity by adding
119. Id. at 1384-86. Justice Brennan, in refuting the majority's view that
Christmas has been celebrated by Americans for two hundred years (Id. at 1365),
argued that (1) no pattern of Christmas observance, secular or religious, existed at
the time the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were adopted; and (2) historical
evidence indicated that the present-day Christmas celebration began in the 1880's.
Id. at 1383 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For example, Puritan beliefs were reflected
in the laws of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, which levied fines for observance of
Christmas, but opposition by Puritans, Baptists, Methodists, and others who eschewed
any celebration gradually gave way to the holiday practices brought to this country
by German immigrants in the mid-1800's. Id. at 1384. These Germans, many of
whom were Roman Catholic, are believed to have introduced the nativity scene to
Americans. Id. at 1385.
120. Id. at 1360.
121. Id. at 1361.
122. Id. at 1381. Dissenting separately, Justice Blackmun indicated agreement
with Justice Brennan's opinion, especially with respect to the application of the Lemon
test. Id. at 1386-87 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He suggested that the Court's finding
of a secular purpose stripped the creche of its religious content and consigned it
to a class of commercial symbols, thereby rendering the question of religious meaning irrelevant. Id.. at 1387. Cf. supra note 117 (Court rejects Justice Brennan's view
that the majority equates nativity scene with secular symbols of Christmas).
123. A matter which was not raised by the Court but which is suggested by
previous establishment clause cases relates to the lack of a statute specifically mandating the conduct of Pawtucket in erecting a display containing a creche. By far,
the majority of establishment clause cases involve laws providing aid to parochial
schools; however, the Lemon test has been applied in cases where a specific governmental practice precipitates a lawsuit, or where no violative conduct has yet taken
place. See Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church and State v. City and County
of Denver, 508 F. Supp. 823 (D. Colo. 1981) (plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prohibit city and county from appropriating funding for and purchasing, exhibiting and appropriating monies for creche); Fox v. City of Los Angeles,
22 Cal. 3d 792, 587 P.2d 663, 150 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978) (taxpayer sued to prevent
display of lighted cross on city hall). In the latter case, only the display of the cross
was in issue. No part of the decision of the California Supreme Court addressed
the source of the funding or whether the city in any way contributed to the initial
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the qualifier of context to the Lemon analysis. By failing to separate
the creche from the display as a whole, the Court has established
a precedent for imbuing symbols which are undeniably religious in
nature' 4 with a secular character if history, tradition and the surrounding decorations so permit.' 25 The secular purpose discerned in
Lynch, to celebrate Christmas and take note of its origin, was seen
by the Court as no more an endorsement of Christianity than the
inclusion of religiously-inspired paintings in public galleries,' 26 the
release of federal employees for Christmas,' 27 or official proclamations of the holiday. 12 Any benefit conferred upon Christianity was
seen as "indirect, remote, and incidental." 129 Having found that this
secular purpose transcended any religious significance attached to the
creche, the Court dismissed the issue of primary effect, largely on
the basis of the mitigating effect of the holiday context.' 30 The Court
justified its finding that religion was not advanced by Pawtucket's
display of the creche by pointing to cases in which a benefit to religion
occurred within constitutional bounds.' 3 ' The Court reasoned that,
purchase of the display. Actions of private organizations may violate the establishment clause whether or not a law or government officials are directly responsible
for other actions in question. See ACLU of Ga. v. Rabun County Chamber of Commerce, 678 F.2d 1379 (l1th Cir. 1982) (erection of privately-funded, lighted cross
on public property by civic organization violates establishment clause).
124. While the Court acknowledged that the religious aspect of any state activity implicates the establishment clause, it stated "[flocus exclusively on the religious
component of any activity would inevitably lead to its invalidation under the Establishment Clause." Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1362. However, what was at issue was whether
the inclusion of the creche, not the entire city-sponsored display, violated the establishment clause. Id. at 1373 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125. The Court did not deny the religious significance of the nativity scene.
Id. at 1366. However, the Court read Lemon to require only a secular purpose,
although Pawtucket argued that an "exclusively secular" purpose existed for the
display. To interpret'the test as requiring an "exclusively secular" purpose would
nullify many of the Court's prior decisions. Id. at 1363, n.6. See supra note 110.
The Court's subsequent historical analysis of government acknowledgment of religion
does not address the question of whether Congress or the President could constitutionally erect a creche on the White House lawn.
126. Id. at 1361.
127. Id. at 1360.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1364.
130. Id.
131. The majority of cases singled out by the Court involved aid to education
and the free exercise clause. None of the cases cited involved a government's use
of a religious symbol. Moreover, the government's reliance on the holiday season
in justifying its display of the nativity scene would appear to merit even closer examination in order to ascertain whether its alleged reasons are a pretext for conduct
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if Christmas carols were being sung in public schools, and if the
majority of the people were themselves celebrating the holiday through
the use of traditional symbols, then the government could not be barred
from engaging in the same activity. 3 ' It ultimately concluded that
to prevent Pawtucket from using the creche would invalidate any
government accommodation of the holiday.' 33 In so deciding, the majority disregarded the district court's finding that Mayor Lynch was
behind an effort to "Keep Christ in Christmas.""'3 In addition, there
was evidence that the Pawtucket display was intended for commercial purposes only, and that the display would have continued had
the Court enjoined use of the creche."'3
In applying the excessive entanglement test, the Court supported
the finding of the Court of Appeals that no excessive administrative
entanglement resulted from the city's sponsorship of the Christmas
display.' 3 The Court agreed that the city did not consult with any
religious groups regarding the content of the display, and also that
the expenses accompanying the purchase and maintenance of the
creche, as part of the holiday exhibit, were de minimus and concluded
that the Pawtucket city officials were not impermissibly involved in
37
a religious activity.'
Chief Justice Burger analyzed the second half of the inquiry,
whether the presence of the creche generated political controversy,
under rationale suggested in the dicta in Mueller v. Allen,'3 8 rather
which is in fact impermissible. See Stone, 449 U.S. at 41 (an "avowed" secular purpose is not enough to avoid conflict with the first amendment).
132. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1365.
133. Id.

134. The district court found significant the number of letters to Mayor Lynch
and to a local newspaper supporting the city's effort to keep the creche in the display:
The most recurrent comments appearing in over half the letters are that
the birth of Christ is the essence of Christmas, and that the presence of
the creche, as a symbol of the spiritual core, is necessary to preserve the
true meaning of the holiday .... [T]he Mayor's insistence on preserving
the creche was lauded by many as a determination to "keep Christ in
Christmas" and, more broadly, to keep God in American life.

Lynch, 525 F. Supp. at 1161.
135. Id. at 1170. See Lowe v. City of Eugene, 254 Or. 518, 463 P.2d 360 (1969)
(cross erected in part to "enhance the commercial exploitation of the principal Christian holidays"). The Court agreed with the dissent's view that the commercial nature
of the display in no way affected the "character" of the exhibit. Similarly, it Pointed
out that congressional invocations do not suffer any change in character simply because

they, accompany partisan debate on "mundane subjects." Id. at 1365.
136. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1364.
137. Id.
138. 103 S.Ct. 3062 (1983). Justice Rehnquist, noting that the parties to the
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than in accordance with the Lemon test as it relates to this element.
The Court determined that it no longer had to view the potential
for political conduct as an indicator that establishment clause principles were being compromised, except in a situation where teachers
139
in parochial schools were receiving direct subsidies from the state.
Having eliminated the possibility of political conflict from the inquiry,
the Court then focused on the degree of political divisiveness actually
engendered by the city's inclusion of the creche in its display, and
determined that the filing of the lawsuit, standing alone, was insufficient evidence of community polarization.'""
Under this methodology, the intrusion of politics into religion
and religion into politics,'" viewed as an unwholesome development
under Lemon because of the tendency to divert national attention away
from more pressing matters,' 2 appears to be more likely to occur.
In Lynch, the district court found that the community divisiveness
was a warning signal that first amendment principles were being
breached,'" 3 a rationale which is wholly consistent with the problem
articulated in Lemon.
suit had not challenged the potential for political divisiveness as the proper standard
for resolving this issue, nevertheless stated that this analysis should be limited to
a few narrow situations. Id. at 3071, n.11.
139. "This case does not involve a direct subsidy to church-sponsored schools
or colleges, or other religious institutions, and hence no inquiry into potential political
divisiveness is even called for. . .

."

Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1365 (citing Mueller v.

Allen, 103 S. Ct. at 3071 n.ll).
140. "A litigant cahnot, by the very act of commencing a lawsuit, however,
create the appearance of divisiveness and then exploit it as evidence of entanglement." Id. The Court also noted that no controversy had occurred during the 40
year history of the creche's inclusion in the display. Id. But see Lynch, 525 F. Supp.
at 1179. The district court held that the lack of controversy was a factor to be considered, but the reasons for the silence may signal potential for divisiveness. Was
there no controversy because the religious minority did not feel threatened, or because
peace was preferred to disharmony? Id.
141. See supra note 2. Chief Justice Burger incorporated the view of both Thomas
Jefferson and Roger Williams.
142. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 623.
143. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. at 1180; seeNyquist, 413 U.S. at 798. The Court
relied upon entanglement or involvement as such a warning signal. Lemon, 403 U.S.
at 624-25. Political divisiveness as an analytical tool has itself caused divisiveness
among commentators. Compare L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 14-12,
867-68 (1978) (divisiveness is a useful safeguard against involvement of government

in church matters) with Gaffney, Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The

Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 205 (1980) (political divisiveness is too subjective, applied too inconsistently
and based on little if any authority).
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As as result, though the Court applied the Lemon test, the
test's altered form significantly reduces the protective barriers between intrusive church-state relationships. Moroever, simply by failing to apply a consistent analysis in the recent establishment clause
cases, the Court has supplied a wealth of precedent for altering or
ignoring the test in future cases, " which is curious in light of the
144. In McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984), the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals applied the Lemon test, though it noted the Supreme Court's intention not to be bound by a single test in establishment clause cases. Id. at 725.
The court of appeals relied upon Lynch in reversing a lower court decision upholding
the action of the Scarsdale, New York village board's denial of an application to
erect a privately-owned creche in a public park during the Christmas season. The
court of appeals held that a secular purpose existed, and pointed out that the degree
of entanglement in McCreary was less than occurred in Lynch. Id. at 725. In the
area of primary effect, the court followed Lynch and held that the effect, if any,
of the creche was remote, and that the appearance of endorsement of Christianity
was minimal as a result. Id. at 726-27. The Second Circuit confined its holding to
the facts of McCreary, in finding that the display of the creche in a "public forum"
for two weeks during the Christmas season did not violate the establishment clause.
Id. at 730. The Supreme Court granted the village's petition for writ of certiorari.
Board of Trustees v. McCreary, 105 S. Ct. 291 (1984). Based on the court of appeals'
reliance on Lynch, it is unlikely that the decision will be overturned by the Supreme
Court.
Also before the Court in the 1984-85 term is the Alabama "minute of silence"
case, Wallace v. Jaffree, 705 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983), prob. juris. noted, 104
S. Ct. 1704 (1984). At issue is the constitutionality of an Alabama law directing
public school teachers to observe a minute of silence in the classroom at the beginning of the school day for "meditation or voluntary prayer" 705 F.2d at 1528. The
appeals court reversed the district court's dismissal of the action. Applying the Lemon
test to the statute, the district court found no secular purpose and a primary effect
which advanced religion. Id. The appeals court held that, based on the district court's
finding that the law had a religious purpose and advanced religion, the purpose of
the exercise, not the exercise itself, should be the focal point of judicial scrutiny.
Id. at 1535-36. Meditation or silence was seen as a pretext for advancement of religion,
and was therefore impermissible. Id. at 1536.
In Lynch, the district court found that the creche was a religious symbol and
did not have a secular purpose. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. at 1172. Notwithstanding this
finding, the Supreme Court concluded that in the context of the Christmas holiday,
which has secular as well as religious components, the nativity scene served a secular
purpose, and deemed the lower court's findings to be "clearly erroneous." Lynch,
104 S. Ct. at 1363. Thus, in regard to Wallace, it is conceivable that the Alabama
law could be seen as having a religious component (voluntary prayer) and a nonreligious component (meditation), the latter evidencing a secular purpose. That secular
purpose could be defined as the need to instill reflection as part of a student's training in the public schools. The primary effect may be seen to no more advance religion
than do references to God in the Pledge of Allegiance and The Star-Spangled Banner,
to which public school students are frequently exposed.
Despite the district court's finding in Wallace that the Alabama statute was
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fact that all establishment clause issues, with the exception of those
the basis of
disputed in Larson and Marsh, have been resolved on
45
itself.'
test
the
or
test
Lemon
the
the antecedents of
V.

IMPLICATIONS

The implications of Lynch are twofold. First, the hedging application of the Lemon test will cause confusion in lower courts in

analyzing establishment clause cases. ' " In Greater Houston Chapter
motivated by a desire to involve the state in religious activity, the Supreme Court
may find this conclusion "clearly erroneous" and uphold the law based on its analysis
in Lynch.
In Lynch, Pawtucket's display of the creche was seen by the district court as
official approval of Christianity, a primary effect of advancing religion which was
found to be neither remote nor incidental. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. at 1178. The Supreme
Court held that whatever benefit was conferred upon Christianity by inclusion of the
creche was no more than any other benefit to religion resulting from prior cases
such as Everson and McGowan. Lynch, 104 S. Ct., at 1363.
Applying this analysis to Wallace, the Court may hold that any advancement
of religion resulting from the law is remote and incidental, and that any benefit
to religion would be less than that conferred by prior cases such as Marsh. See supra
notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
Notwithstanding the findings of religious purpose in Wallace, the law may be
upheld by the Supreme Court based on its analysis in Lynch. It is also possible that
the Court may see this law as a non-coercive accommodation of religious beliefs
as found by the Court in Zorach. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
The majority in Zorach upheld the released time program for off-campus religious
exercises based on its finding that the exercises were voluntary and that the schools
merely accommodated the religious needs of the students. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 311-13.
But see McCollum, 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (voluntary religious classes in public schools
struck down). An argument could be made in Wallace that the minute of silence
merely accommodates the religious or spiritual needs of some students, and that all
pupils need not pray. However, the Alabama law makes only the prayer voluntary;
the minute of silence itself is mandatory. Other activities may not take place during
that time. Wallace, 705 F.2d at 1528. In Zorach, attendance at the religious exercises
was reported to the secular teachers; in Wallace, Alabama school teachers are directed
to enforce only the minute of silence. They are not required to police the mental
activity of the students in order to determine whether or not they are actually engaged in meditation or voluntary prayer.
145. Lynch, at 1371 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Fausto v. Diamond, 589
F. Supp. 451, 464 (D. R.I. 1984) ("The current of Lynch courses strongly; and while
it has not washed Lemon away, it has coated the Establishment Clause with a fresh
alluvium."). See also Comment, Publicly-FundedDisplay of Religious Symbols: The
Nativity Scene Controversy, 51 U. Cn'. L. REv. 353 (1982).
146. In May v. Cooperman, 582 F. Supp. 1458 (D. N.J. 1984), the effects of
Lynch were considered in determining whether plaintiffs, challenging New Jersey's
"moment of silence" law, would prevail. The Court explained:
Given the facts in the case which so clearly demonstrate that the purpose
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of ACLU v. Eckels,'" the district court applied the Lemon, Larson,

and Marsh tests'" in response to what it termed "the random approach by the Supreme Court to its analysis of establishment clause
cases."'" 9 The district court found the erection of crosses and a Star

of David in a public park by a county commissioner violative of the
establishment clause under all three tests.'

With the addition of context as a factor in the Lemon analysis,
coupled with the Court's secondary reliance on the test in Larson
and its complete disregard of the test in Marsh, the lower courts are
left with virtually no direction as to how to resolve establishment clause

questions after Lynch. As a result, they may find themselves com-

pelled to uphold questionable governmental forays into religious matters

where the activity takes place in a mitigating setting. For example,
in Fausto v. Diamond,"' a memorial to the "Unknown Child" on
city property was upheld despite a subsequent claim that the display
was essentially an anti-abortion, and therefore, Roman Catholic,
exhibit.' 2 The court relied upon Lynch, concluding that the secular
and effect of the legislation was [sic] religious in nature, the outcome seems
clear. However, one cannot discount the possibility that the United States
Supreme Court may shift course and pursue a "less than vigorous application of the Lemmon [sic] test" in the context of religious practices in public
schools....
Id. at 1462. Cf. United States v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 128, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
("[H]istory may be highly relevant to the proper interpretation of constitutional
provisions.'").
147. 589 F. Supp. 222 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
148. The Marsh "test" relied upon history and tradition: was the activity in
question (placing crosses and a Star of David in a public park) recognized by the
Founding Fathers in the same manner that the legitimacy of a publicly-paid congressional chaplain was recognized as discussed in Marsh? Id. at 237. The district court
questioned its own use of this test and whether or not it was truly a test in the
first place. Id. at 237 n.18. However, the court alluded to the fact that its application of the criteria articulated in Marsh was an effort to avoid remand should one
of the three tests later emerge as definitive. Id. For a discussion of the standards
used by the Supreme Court in Marsh, see supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
149. Eckels, 589 F. Supp. at 233.
150. Id. at 233-38.
151. 589 F. Supp. 451 (D.R.I. 1984).
152. The memorial, designed to coincide with the United Nations' Year of the
Child in 1979, centered around a fountain in Cathedral Square in Providence, Rhode
Island, Id. at 452-53. The fountain had deteriorated, and a committee seeking to
erect a memorial to the "Unknown Child" offered to repair the fountain in exchange for city permission to have the fountain declared "The Fountain of Life."
Id. at 453-54. The controversy focused on the arguable religious content of a Biblical
quotation and a mother-and-child engraving exhibited on plaques within the memorial.
Id. at 457-58. Cathedral Square, while owned by the city, faced the largest Catholic
church in the Rhode Island diocese. Id. at 452.
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a dedication ceremony that was
purpose of the memorial, despite
"overtly religious in nature,"' 3 was "legitimate."" 4
The primary effect of the memorial, "seen through the Lynch
glass,"' 5 5 was found to be more an advancement of religion than the
nativity scene in Lynch. 5 6 Even if the memorial had represented a
religious viewpoint, the district court would be constrained to find
the effect to be too remote to constitute a primary effect which advanced religion.' 57
On the question of entanglement, the court found no evidence
of continuing involvement between church authorities and the city.' 8
The amount of financial outlay on the part of the city was de
minimis. '" The court concluded that the events in question culminating
6
in the lawsuit were one-time acts and not representative of city policy.'1
The memorial, "seen in the refracted afterglow of Lynch, is not a
shrine, but simply another piece of municipal decoration." 6 '
Courts have expressed differing views about the effects of Lynch
in cases involving nativity scenes. In McCreary v. Stone,'6 2 the court
of appeals applied Lemon in the wake of Lynch and reversed the
district court's decision upholding denial of an application to display
a creche in a public park during the Christmas season.' 6 3 The appeals
court agreed with the lower court that the public park was a "traditional public forum,"'164 and that a secular purpose resulted from the
6
city's policy of allowing the property to be used for various purposes.
153. Id. at 463.

154. Id. at 467. The Court used a rational basis test to conclude that the city's
goal was legitimate. "That being so, no further inquiry is in order, as Lynch has
sounded the death-knell of any notion that the government's objectives must be wholly
secular." (citation omitted) Id. See supra note 125.
155. Id. at 468.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 469.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 470.

162. 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 291 (1984).
163. Id. at 730.

164. Id.at 722.
165. Id. at 725. The appeals court and district court relied in part on the Supreme
Court's opinion in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). In Widmar, students
at the University of Missouri successfully challenged a university regulation that banned
religious groups from meeting at the university. The Court characterized religious
discussion as speech protected by the first amendment, and concluded that an equal
access policy would not compromise the state's compelling interest in assuring separation of church and state. Id. at 271. The Court found that allowing religious groups
to speak at the university met all three prongs of the Lemon test. Id. at 271-73.
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The lower court ruled that excessive administrative entanglement would
not result from the display of a creche because the same application
66
procedure was required of all groups desiring to use the park.'
Political divisiveness was seen as insufficient to justify the city's action
in denying the application.' 67 In applying the primary effect prong
of Lemon, the appeals court focused on the facts in McCreary and
Lynch, and concluded that, if display of the publicly-owned creche
in Lynch did not violate the establishment clause, then the display
of the privately-owned creche in a public forum in 8McCreary could
6
serve as no more of an advancement of religion.'
A critical view of the Second Circuit's reading of Lynch was expressed by the district court in American Civil Liberties Union v. City
of Birmingham,' 69 when it reviewed the constitutionality of a cityowned nativity scene displayed during the Christmas season.' The
defendant city argued that the creche, which was displayed alone in
front of city hall from late November through early January,' 7 ' had
a secular purpose in the context of the holiday season.' 72 The district
court found no secular purpose, distinguishing City of Birmingham
from Lynch:
The nativity scene here stood alone, on public property, maintained

by public monies, for all, the Christians, the Jews, the Muslims,
the atheists, all citizens of Birmingham, to view as a municipal endorsement. There were no red and green banners, candy canes, or
little toy soldiers about. In short, there was nothing to offset the
purely religious cast of the display.' 73

The court ruled that the display implicitly conveyed municipal
endorsement of Christianity."" Though no administrative entanglement was explicitly found, the potential for political divisiveness was
seen as a threat to establishment clause values. '
166. McCreary, 739 F.2d at 725.

167. Id.
168. Id. at 726-27.

169. 588 F. Supp. 1337 (E.D. Mich. 1984).

170. Id. at 1340.
171. Id. at 1338.
172. Id. at 1339.
173. Id. The district court's analysis suggests that in future nativity scene cases,
Lynch may be distinguished on its facts by the lower courts. See Burelle v. City
of Nashua, Civ. No. 82-705-D (D.N.H. Dec. 18, 1984) (city enjoined from allowing
display of privately-owned creche on city grounds; court focused on lack of secular
"symbols or disclaimers" in distinguishing creche standing alone from creche in
Lynch).

174. Id.
175. Birmingham, 588 F. Supp. at 1339.
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The district court in City of Birmingham disputed the Second
Circuit's contention in McCreary that a secular purpose for exhibiting
a nativity scene existed whether the creche stood alone or was surrounded by other seasonal symbols, as long as it was displayed in
the context of the Christmas season: 7' "This court cannot discover
the clarity in the Lynch decision upon which the McCreary court
expounds." 1 " The court noted that no commercial purposes were

claimed by Birmingham and that the creche was displayed by the city
for a longer period than the nativity scene in McCreary.'
In light of the confusion experienced by courts in interpreting
Lynch, it appears to be entirely possible that municipalities may
sponsor essentially religious displays on a pretext' 79 of offering a
representative tableau of seasonal symbols,' 80 and have their activities
176. Id. at 1340.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. In Schempp, Justice Douglas cautioned against subverting the establishment clause by circuitous means:
Financing a church either in its strictly religious activities or in its other
activities is equally unconstitutional .... It is not the amount of public
funds expended ... it is the use to which public funds are put that is con-

trolling. For the First Amendment does not say that some forms of establishment are allowed; it says that "no law respecting an establishment of
religion" shall be made. What may not be done directly may not be done
indirectly lest the Establishment Clause become a mockery.
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 229-30 (Douglas, J., concurring).
180. Examples of such displays include a Thanksgiving display featuring a Pilgrim
couple, turkey, pumpkins, an Indian, and a sheaf of wheat. Would the inclusion
of a cross add religious overtones to the exclusion of the secular meaning? Although
many Americans observe Thanksgiving with religious services and prayer, the holiday is secular as well. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1381 (Brennan, J., dissenting). An Easter
display with an Easter Bunny, lambs, colored eggs, chicks and flowers constitutes
a typical springtime scene; however, would the addition of a cross focus attention
on the religious aspect any more than if the cross stood alone? See, e.g., Lowe v.
City of Eugene, 254 Or. 518, 463 P.2d 360 (1969) (injunction upheld preventing
construction of lighted Latin cross for commercial promotion of Christmas and Easter);
Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 3d 792, 587 P.2d 663, 150 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978)
("[Tihat the spiritual content of the cross is central to the spiritual significance of
Easter is a matter of common knowledge.") Could a city erect a Buddha in a public
park, surround it with springtime symbols, and claim the display had nothing to
do with Buddha's birth (celebrated on April 8) and everything to do with the "secular"
aspect of the holiday? What if Buddha's birth coincided with Easter, and the community had a Christian minority? Would the result be any different if the community was largely made up of recently-naturalized Japanese and Vietnamese immigrants?
What if the city was populated by third-generation Americans of Japanese and Vietnamese descent? In determining whether religion is advanced as a result of government conduct, perhaps holiday "context" is decided by the religious makeup of the
community.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

survive first amendment review. It will be up to the governmental
bodies to decide which religious symbols deserve inclusion, as well
as which secular decorations will be necessary to offset the overtly
religious impact of the former.' 8 ' Under the Lynch analysis, it seems
likely that the use of the Ten Commandments in Kentucky schools
disputed in Stone v. Graham'82 would have been upheld as a per3
missible use of religion in the "context" of education.'
The second implication arising from Lynch results from the
Court's sanction of government-sponsored religious activity. Religious
and non-religious groups, jockeying for favored position in the eyes
of government, will increase the "excessive entanglement" between
government and religion. 8 4 The Court has provided the opportunity
8 5 Such
for religion to become a political force in the community.'
a result foreshadows the fears of the drafters of the first amendment:
181. See Lowe, supra note 135. The Oregon Supreme Court rejected the contention that the cross in question served a secular purpose:
The principal purpose which motivated the city council was its desire to
conform to the desires of a majority of the citizens of the community, who
conscientiously believed that their preferred religious symbol was entitled
to preferential public display simply because the majority wished it so. Such
a response to majority religious pressure is, of course, exactly what specific
guarantees of rights in the state and federal constitutions were designed to
prevent.
Id., 463 P.2d at 362-63. But see Friedman v. Board of County Comm'rs of Bernalillo County, No. 82-1064 (10th Cir. Dec. 27, 1984) (use of cross in county seal
upheld based on secular purpose and effect of commemorating historical significance
of Catholic missionaries in region).
182. See supra note 70.
183. Though the Court struck down the Kentucky law under the purpose prong
of Lemon, an argument could be made that, comparing the abundance of historical
analysis in Lynch to the references to God in the Pledge of Allegiance, the singing
of Christmas carols in schools, the observance of Christian holidays in the school
system, and the duty of the school to develop "moral and spiritual values" as claimed in Engel, that inclusion of the decalogue would have been consistent with all
the other manifestations of divine reference commonly accepted in American schools,
and therefore, the Kentucky law possessed a secular legislative purpose similar to
that actually claimed by the Kentucky legislature.
184. Justice Brennan, in his dissent in Lynch, noted the potential for increased
administrative entanglement in requests of religious groups for government inclusion
of their symbols. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1374 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This subject
was addressed in Walz by Justice Harlan, who stressed the threat of "undue fragmentation" when government plans and administers activities involving sectarian organizations. Waz, 397 U.S. at 695 (separate opinion of Harlan, J.).
185. Government support of religion places government's stamp of approval on
the religion in question and inhibits the non-believer. Although direct pressure in
the form of prayer in school is a familiar example, it is argued that strict neutrality
should extend to other government activities which produce subtler effects. See Note,
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What influence in fact have ecclesiastical establishments had on Civil
Society? In some instances they have been seen to erect a spiritual
tyranny on the ruins of Civil authority; in many instances they have
been seen [as] upholding the thrones of political tyranny; in no instance have they been seen [as] the guardians of the liberties of the
people. Rulers who wished to subvert the public liberty, may have
found an established clergy convenient auxiliaries. A just government, instituted to secure and perpetuate it, needs them not.'" 6

Such potential for divisiveness, acknowledged by the Court in
Lemon,'87 was disregarded in Lynch despite evidence that divisiveness
existed prior to the filing of the suit.' 88 Notwithstanding the view that
reasons to prohibit the involvement of government and religion in
recent history may be less compelling than in the time of the Founding
Fathers,' 9 the decision of the Court in Lynch promotes the reemergence of this conflict. 9 0
Rebuilding the Wall: The Case for a Return to the Strict Interpretation of the
Establishment Clause, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1481-84 (1981).
186. J.

MADISON,

MEMORIAL

AND

REMONSTRANCE

AGAINST

RELIGIOUS

par. 8, reprinted in Everson, 330 U.S. at 64. The establishment clause
was designed to protect against "sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity." Walz, 397 U.S. at 668. "The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between
ASSESSMENTS,

religion and nonreligion." Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 103, 104 (1968). Madison

viewed separation of church and state as a control over the development of factions.

The greater the separation, the more freely religions could thrive. In recent cases,
however, the Burger Court has ignored the divisiveness test (which assesses faction)
and has chosen to promote the development of "religious multiplicity." Curry, James

Madison and the Burger Court: Converging Views of Church-State Separation, 56
IND. L. J. 615, 626-36 (1981).
187. See supra note 66.
188. The district court found evidence that Donnelly saw the city's use of the

creche as an example of political involvement on the part of religious groups to

"impose their views on the larger society." Lynch, 525 F. Supp. at 1156.
189. In Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), an Ohio law providing textbooks, diagnostic services and remedial services to parochial schools was upheld,
and part of the same law loaning instructional materials and equipment and funding
field trips was held invalid. In assessing entanglement, Justice Powell stated:
It is important to keep these issues in perspective. At this point in the
20th century we are quite far removed from the dangers that prompted the
Framers to include the Establishment Clause in the Bill of Rights .... [tihe

risk of significant religious or even denominational control over our

democratic processes-or even of deep political division along religious
lines-is remote ...

Id. at 263 (Powell, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
190. The prominence of the church-state question has drawn the attention of

the courts, Congress, the President and the people. See Herbers, J., Reagan Beginn-
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VI.

CONCLUSION

A new spectrum of permissible government conduct has resulted
from the Court's decision in Lynch v. Donnelly. Whether the
heretofore settled Lemon test will be selectively applied or altered is
a question that will be answered in future cases. Assuredly, there will
be future cases, as groups desiring or decrying state sanction of
religious activity file suit to establish first amendment rights. Lower
courts, unsure of the proper standard of analysis, may issue conflicting
opinions, creating the need for continued and repeated interpretations
by the Court of what symbolism can survive in context and what
is constitutionally impermissible. Whatever clarification results, the
Court has taken a step off the tightrope between church and state.
JACQUELINE
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